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Most small island economies or ‘microstates’ have distinctly different characteristics 
from larger developing economies. They are more open and vulnerable to external and 
environmental shocks, resulting in high output volatility. Most of them also suffer from 
locational disadvantages. Although a few small island economies have succeeded in 
generating sustained rapid growth and reducing poverty, most have dismal growth 
performance, resulting in high unemployment and poverty. Although macroeconomic 
policies play an important role in growth and poverty reduction, there has been very 
little work on the issue for small island economies or microstates. Most work follows 
the conventional framework and finds no or very little effectiveness of macroeconomic 
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policies in stabilization. They also concentrate on short-run macroeconomic 
management with a focus almost entirely on either price stability or external balance. 
The presumption is that price stability and external balance are prerequisite for 
sustained rapid growth. This paper aims to provide a critical survey of the extant 
literature on macroeconomic policies for small island economies in light of the available 
evidence on their growth performance. Given the high output volatility and its impact 
on poverty, this paper will argue for a balance between price and output stabilization 
goals of macroeconomic policy mix. Drawing on the highly successful experience of 
Singapore, it will also outline a framework for growth promoting, pro-poor 
macroeconomic policies for small island economies/microstates.  
Acronyms 
AD aggregate  demand 
CPF  Central Provident Fund  
ECCU  Eastern Caribbean Currency Union  
GLCs  government linked companies  
HDI  human development index  
IMF  International Monetary Fund  
SMEs  smaller and medium size enterprises  
 1 
1 Introduction 
One characteristic that small island economies share is vulnerability. This arises from a 
number of factors, such as small size, remoteness, proneness to natural disasters, and 
environmental fragility (see Briguglio 1995; Atkins, Mazzi and Easter 2000). They are 
also very open economies with a high trade-GDP ratio, but their export base is very 
narrow, dominated by primary products and natural resources. They are largely 
dependent on external financial assistance, and their financial sector is extremely 
shallow. Thus, small island economies are subject to external disturbances from the 
world goods and financial markets. As a result, small island economies experience 
significant volatility in their economic growth.  
While most observers believe that small island economies are structurally 
disadvantaged, some hold the view that they also have advantages. Kuznets (1960), for 
example, notes the advantage of a small and more cohesive population which allows 
them to adapt better to change. Easterly and Kraay (2000) argue that the growth 
advantages of openness (trade and investment) outweigh the disadvantages in terms of 
trade volatility, and hence, small states do not necessarily have a poorer economic 
performance than larger countries.1 Nevertheless, real per capita GDP growth tends to 
be much more volatile in smaller economies than in larger ones, and there is a growing 
consensus that high output or growth volatility adversely affects the poor. That is, the 
poor are more vulnerable to shocks and macroeconomic volatilities (see de Ferranti  
et al. 2000; World Bank 2000). The poor have less human capital to adapt to downturns 
in labour markets. They have less assets and access to credit to facilitate consumption 
smoothing. There may be irreversible losses in nutrition and educational levels if there are 
no appropriate safety nets, as is usually the case in most developing countries. The World 
Development Report 2000/2001 (World Bank 2000) finds an asymmetric behaviour of 
poverty levels during deep cycles: poverty levels increase sharply in deep recessions and 
do not come back to previous levels as output recovers.2  
This is an important observation in light of the orthodox macroeconomic policy package 
designed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since the early 1980s. The focus of 
such policies has been almost entirely on either price stability or external balance. The 
presumption is that price stability and external balance are prerequisites for sustained 
rapid growth. Using the macroeconomic experience of the Caribbean and Pacific Island 
economies, this paper will argue for a balance between price and output stabilization goals 
of macroeconomic policy mix. This paper also takes a contrary view to the conventional 
wisdom that small open island economies do not have much control over their 
macroeconomic instruments. The experience of Singapore shows that an island economy 
can successfully stabilize both the employment and price levels by adopting innovative 
                                                 
1   In a cross-country regression with 157 countries, Easterly and Kraay (2000) find that: ‘microstates are 
50 per cent richer than other states, controlling for location’. In a sample of 48 countries, Milner and 
Westaway (1993) find no significant evidence of the effect of country size on economic growth. Also, 
Armstrong et al. (1998) find in their cross-country regressions no significant effect of population size 
on economic growth. Srinivasan (1986) and Streeten (1993) argue that small may be beautiful. 
Singapore and Hong Kong are examples of two highly successful yet small economies.  
2   Scatter plots of a large number of cross-country data reveal that the variability of nominal GDP 
growth has a negative correlation with the growth of the average income of the poorest fifth of the 
population, and a positive correlation with inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient). See 
Chowdhury (2006). Also see Glewwe and Hall (1998). 2 
macroeconomic policy-mixes. Drawing on Singapore experience, this paper will outline a 
framework for growth promoting, pro-poor macroeconomic policies for small island 
economies/microstates.  
2  Economic characteristics of Caribbean and Pacific Island economies 
Table 1 listx basic socioeconomic indicators of Caribbean and Pacific Island economies. 
Table 2 lists their vulnerability index and output volatility index. As can be seen, despite 
their smallness and high vulnerability, their real GDP per capita (in PPP terms) is 
reasonably high when compared with larger developing countries. A number of Caribbean 
Island economies also have a high human development index (HDI), while the rest are 
ranked as medium human development countries. Analysing the relative performance of 
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Table 2 
Composite vulnerability and output volatility index of Caribbean and Pacific Island economies 
  Composite vulnerability    Output volatility 
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Note:   Rank amongst 110 developing and island states. 
Source:   Commonwealth Secretariat (2000). 
 
small island developing economies, Lino Briguglio (1995: 1622) wondered: ‘whether 
the economic fragilities of small island developing economies are actually the reason for 
their relatively high GDP per capita and human development index’.  
The high real per capita income and HDI may, therefore, give an impression that 
poverty in the Caribbean and Pacific Islands is not as acute as in other countries. 
However, surveys of living conditions conducted between 1996 and 2002 in the 
Caribbean reveal a very different picture. These surveys used poverty measures in terms 
of the ability to buy a basic consumption basket of food and non-food items, such as 
education, housing and transportation. According to these surveys (see Figure 1), Haiti 
and Suriname are at the high end of the spectrum with an estimated poverty incidence of 
65 per cent and 63 per cent, respectively. Clustered in the 30-40 per cent range are 
Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, St Kitts and Nevis, and St Vincent and the 
Grenadines. The estimated poverty rates in Anguilla, St Lucia and Trinidad and Tobago 
range between 20 per cent and 29 per cent, while they are 14 per cent and 20 per cent, 
respectively in Barbados and Jamaica.3 
The quality of life is equally dismal in the Pacific Islands. For example, in Papua New 
Guinea (PNG) and Vanuatu 38-40 per cent of the population lives below the national 
                                                 
3   These figures are cited from Bourne (2005).  4 
basic needs poverty line,4 and about 61 per cent do not have access to safe water. While 
58 per cent of children are receiving education in Vanuatu, the figure is only 41 per cent 
in PNG. In Fiji, the percentage of the population living below the national basic poverty 
line in Fiji is 25 per cent, and 53 per cent of the population do not have access to safe 
water. The poverty rate in Samoa is about 20 per cent, and in the Solomon Islands only 
52 per cent of children are enrolled in education.  
What is more disturbing is the vulnerability of the population to poverty. For example, 
in Jamaica the poverty rate goes up from 3.2 per cent to 25.2 per cent when the 
international poverty line moves from $1-a-day to $2-a-day. In Dominican Republic, the 
poverty rate jumps from 3.2 per cent to 16.0 per cent, and in Trinidad and Tobago, it 
rises from 12.4 per cent to 39.0 per cent with the upward adjustment of the international 
poverty line.5 This means a large number of people live just above the poverty line, and 
any sustained adverse shock to the economic can push them to poverty. Therefore, it is 
important to analyse the sources of volatility in order to stabilize income and 
employment growth at a high level. 
Figure 1 
Poverty rate, selected Caribbean and Pacific Island economies, per cent 

























Source:   Bourne (2005); Oxfam (2007); Abbot and Pollard (2004); UNDP (various years). 
3  Macroeconomic performance and sources of volatility 
As can be seen from Panels A and B in Figure 2, extreme volatility is the hallmark of 
both Caribbean and Pacific Islands, and for most, growth remains subdued, averaging at 
less than 4 per cent. This is despite the fact that most have been quite successful in 
containing the inflation rate at less than 4 per cent. This indicates that price stability or 
 
                                                 
4  National basic needs poverty line is a measure of the minimum income needed to buy sufficient food 
and meet basic needs such as housing, clothing, transport, school fees, etc. (Oxfam 2007).  
5  These figures are from UNDP (2002).  
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Figure 2 
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Source:   World Bank (2002b) and ECLAC (2006) for the Caribbean Islands, and ESCAP (2006) for the 
Pacific Islands. 
low inflation may be a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for sustained economic 
growth.6 Volatility of growth itself may affect growth, as economic instability tends to 
skew investment towards short-run gains in a non-optimal way (Perry 2003).  
                                                 
6  Fichera (2006: 51), in reviewing the macroeconomic performance of the Pacific Islands and the 
Eastern Caribbean Currency Union countries, remarks: ‘policies … although effective at maintaining 
relative macroeconomic stability over 1995-2004, have not been effective at promoting growth. 




Panel A: CARIBBEAN ISLANDS
 
Panel B: PACIFIC ISLANDS 6 
Importantly, economic volatility affects more adversely the employment and incomes of 
less skilled workers, who do not have adequate coping mechanism. The absence of 
publicly funded well-targeted safety nets accentuates the problem. Thus, in addition to 
hard-core poor, a large number of people remain vulnerable to shocks to the economy. 
Hence, macroeconomic policies should aim not just at price stability, but also at output 
and employment stabilization, especially when shocks originate from the supply side.7 
Figure 3 
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Source: World Bank (2002b) and ECLAC (2006) for the Caribbean Islands, and ESCAP (2006) for the 
Pacific Islands. 
                                                 
7   Interestingly, contrary to what has become known as the so-called ‘Washington consensus’ as pursued 
by the IFIs that aimed solely on stabilizing the nominal variables (e.g., inflation), the originator of the 
Washington consensus, John Williamson did include the need to stabilize the real economy a la 
Keynes in his list of ‘good policies’. See Williamson (2004). 
Panel A: CARIBBEAN ISLANDS 
Panel B: PACIFIC ISLANDS7 
 
Figure 4A 














Source:   World Bank (2002a). 
Figure 4B 







































Note:  Terms-of-trade shocks are defined as (trade/GDP)x(change in terms of trade). 
Source:   World Bank (2002a). 
 
It is well accepted that the island economies are particularly prone to natural disasters 
(Figure 4A). As Figure 4B shows, Caribbean and Pacific Island economies have also 
suffered larger terms of trade shocks than two successful island economies, Singapore 
and Hong Kong. A relatively favourable disposition certainly has played a role in 
Singapore and Hong Kong’s better macroeconomic and growth performance. 
Nonetheless, their economic condition was not hugely different in the 1950s and 1960s 
from the Caribbean and Pacific Islands, with widespread unemployment and poverty.8 
Economic policies and the activism of the government, especially in Singapore, have 
been largely responsible for the turnaround in their fortunes. In addition, both Singapore 
and Hong Kong are better able to absorb shocks due to the depth of their financial 
sector. 
                                                 
8   Singapore’s poverty rate was nearly 25 per cent in the mid-1950s, and even in 1970, the 
unemployment rate was over 8 per cent. 8 
While the island economies are subjected to mostly adverse supply shocks, nearly all of 
them followed conservative macroeconomic policies, as required by their adjustment 
package with the IMF.9 This is evident from Figure 5A, which shows the growth rates 
of domestic credit to the private sector. As can be seen, domestic credit grew at a much 
faster rate in Singapore and Hong Kong. In the case of the Caribbean countries, 
domestic credit to the private sector remained more or less stagnant since the 1980s. 
That is, the monetary policy stance in these countries has been by and large 
contractionary.  
There is a consensus that fiscal policy in most poor countries with a weak revenue base 
tends to be procyclical.10 Government revenue in the small Caribbean and Pacific 
Island economies depends excessively on trade taxes and foreign aid. Thus, trade shocks 
and aid volatility are a major source of instability in government revenue. If foreign aid 
flows do not match the loss of revenue during adverse shocks, governments are forced 
to cut investment expenditure, since it is politically difficult to cut the non-development 
expenditure, such as civil servant salaries or various subsidies and welfare programs. 
This exacerbates the impact of shocks, as well as harms the long-term growth potential. 
This kind of adjustment was observed particularly in the Pacific Island economies, 
where development expenditure which was already too low as a percentage of public 
spending. However, there have been some differences in the fiscal policy response of 
the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU) governments. They: 
dedicated a large share of their spending to public investment, 
particularly during the 1980s, when external assistance was abundant. In 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, these countries raised public spending, 
including for investment, trying to offset exogenous shocks on growth 
and declining private investment (Fichera 2006: 50-1).  
As a result, the ECCU countries grew at a faster rate. Even the worst performing ECCU 
country experienced positive growth (2.5 per cent on average) in per capita income 
during 1995-2004. 
Figure 5B shows that public consumption growth has been highly volatile in both 
Caribbean and Pacific Island economies. Perry (2003) finds that fiscal volatility 
accounts for 15 per cent among the causes of excess volatility in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. This excessive volatility in the growth of public consumption is largely due 
to boom-bust nature of the revenue, and results in procyclical fiscal policy. Thus, one 
can reasonably conclude that procyclical fiscal policy and tighter monetary policy 
aimed solely at price stability in the wake of exogenous supply shocks exacerbated the 
impacts of shocks.11 This brings us to the critical issue of the role of macroeconomic 
policies. 
                                                 
9   See Worrell (1987) for the experience of Caribbean economies. For the Pacific Islands experience, see 
Siwatibau (1993).  
10  Eslava (2006) surveys the literature on the determinants of procyclicality of fiscal policy. Also see 
Gavin et al. (1996) for the Latin American and Caribbean context.  
11  ECLAC (2006: 36) in its Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1999-2000 comments: ‘The 
priority given … to fighting inflation and restoring credibility of stabilization policies had given a 
procyclical bias to macroeconomic policy…’.  9 
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Source:   World Bank (2000). 
The recent empirical growth literature shows that there is a strong negative correlation 
between procyclical fiscal behaviour and the rate of long-term growth. On the other 
hand, countercyclical fiscal policy enhances growth possibility by providing fiscal 
reliefs (tax cuts and subsidies) to the struggling private sector during economic 
downturns, as well as by boosting government investment in key economic and social 
sectors.12 
The restrictive monetary and procyclical fiscal policy stance not only accentuates the 
depth of economic contraction and harms long-term growth, but also has an 
asymmetrically adverse impact on the poor. To begin with, a tighter credit policy affects 
small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs), which depend mostly on bank financing, 
more than it affects the larger firms. This has adverse employment impacts for the low-
skilled workers, as evidenced by the negative correlation between the volatility of 
                                                 
12  United Nations’ World Economic and Social Survey 2006 (chapter IV) provides a brief summary of 
literature on the economic and social consequences procyclical macroeconomic policies.  10 
nominal GDP and the income growth of the poor.13 Studies also find that social 
expenditures are kept at best constant as a percentage of GDP during downturns, and the 
more targeted social expenditures tend to fall as a percentage of GDP, when they should 
expand as the number of poor and unemployed increases.14  
4  Role of macroeconomic policies 
4.1  Conventional macroeconomic models for small open economies 
What role can macroeconomic policies play in very open small island economies? 
Khatkhate and Short (1980) believe very little. According to them, the degree of 
policymakers’ control over macroeconomic target variables (e.g., output, inflation and 
external balance) is inversely proportional to the degree of openness of the product 
market.15 The fact that mini states are pricetakers in the international market, the 
volume of exports, and therefore output, is determined by the mini state’s productive 
capacity, which is influenced more by such factors as weather than macroeconomic 
policies. Being at the same time highly import-dependent, their inflation is by and large 
determined by their trading partners.  
Corden (1984), on the other hand, using the example of Singapore, develops a model of 
a small open economy where all products are tradable, and demonstrated that exchange 
rates can be used to target inflation and wages policies to target competitiveness, and 
hence, employment. Since the aggregate demand for output is perfectly price elastic, 
domestic demand, and hence monetary policy and fiscal policy, do not have any direct 
effects on the price level or employment.16 To the extent that the monetary authority 
pegs the exchange rate to a pre-determined level, money supply becomes endogenous. 
Thus, monetary policy works only through its effects on the exchange rate. When the 
exchange rate is allowed to float, perfect capital mobility renders fiscal policy 
ineffective due to induced exchange rate effects.17 
                                                 
13  See Chowdhury (2006). 
14  See the World Bank study by de Ferranti et al. (2000). 
15 ‘by its [mini state’s] exposure to foreign trade such that the economic targets of its economy are 
largely beyond its control’ Khatkhate and Short (1980: 1018). Caram (1989) holds a very similar 
view: ‘Under the conditions now prevalent in small developing countries, it is not to be expected that 
monetary financing and the ensuing increase in effective demand will result in an appreciable increase 
in domestic production. The domestically generated supply of goods is insufficiently diversified and, 
as a result of physical and organizational bottlenecks, has barely any short-term elasticity. Owing to 
this and to the ample opportunities for imports, despite the exchange controls in force, the additional 
demand will focus largely on the supply from abroad. The so-called monetary approach to the balance 
of payments … proves to be highly topical for these countries’. 
16 In an economy (closed or open) with a downward aggregate demand (AD), expansionary monetary 
and fiscal policies work by raising the price level. Increased price level reduces real wage and hence 
increases employment and output. But when an economy faces a perfectly price elastic AD, the 
domestic price level cannot differ from the world price.   
17  This follows from the standard Mundell-Fleming IS-LM-BP model with flexible exchange rates and 
perfect capital mobility.  11 
Treadgold (1992) provided a critique of Khatkhate and Short, and extended Corden’s 
model to suit the conditions of small Pacific Island economies. To begin with, a number 
of Caribbean and Pacific Island economies do not have separate currencies; they use 
either US, Australian or New Zealand dollars. Thus, they cannot have the exchange rate 
instrument as suggested by the Corden model, but they can still use wages policy for 
employment target. Second, even for those economies which have their own currencies, 
the assumption of perfect capital mobility is not relevant, as this would require perfect 
substitutability between domestic and foreign bonds. However, even when the 
assumption of perfect capital mobility is replaced with incomplete capital mobility, 
Treadgold shows that under different labour market conditions, the policy implications 
of the basic Corden model remain relevant. When money wages are inflexible 
downward, the achievement of the employment target would require abandoning an 
independent inflation target. That is, the exchange rate should be varied to achieve the 
domestic inflation needed to reduce real wage for the employment target. On the other 
hand, the downward real wage inflexibility excludes the possibility of achieving any 
independent employment target, and macro policy (i.e., exchange rate policy) should be 
directed to controlling the price level only. Finally, the microstates which experience a 
high degree of labour mobility with larger economies essentially face a given real wage 
determined in the larger economies. Their labour market mimics a competitive labour 
market, and hence, employment is determined endogenously. As in the case of 
downward real wage inflexibility, these microstates should use the exchange rate to 
achieve the inflation target. 
In sum, fiscal and monetary policies cannot play stabilizing roles in any of the three 
theoretical models reviewed above. In the Corden model and its modified version, the 
stabilization (price level and employment) role is assigned to the exchange rate and 
wages policies. The fact that some Caribbean and Pacific Island economies could 
successfully maintain very low inflation rates by using conventional demand 
management policies proves Khatkhate and Short’s conclusion wrong. To the extent 
that the effectiveness of policy instruments (exchange rates) in the Corden-Treadgold 
framework depends on falling real wages, it does not offer much hope in economies 
where poverty is high and real wage is at the subsistence level. In these countries, real 
wage resistance does not have to be an outcome of a centralized wage-setting 
mechanism and/or the nature labour market institutions. Real wage is already so low 
that it cannot be reduced any further.18  
All three models focus on the demand-side role of fiscal and monetary policies and 
ignore the fact that in developing countries, these policies are used predominantly for 
economic growth and hence enhancing aggregate supply. Thus, employment creations 
in these models imply movement along the labour demand curve (i.e., the reduction in 
real wage). They also assume symmetry in both capital inflows and outflows, and 
consider only short-term portfolio investment, not long-term foreign direct investment. 
Most developing countries, especially the small Caribbean and Pacific Island 
economies, do not attract much capital flows. As noted earlier, vulnerability risks 
outweigh the expected gains from interest rate differentials, and they are more prone to 
capital flights than capital inflows. For their long-term economic growth, they need 
foreign direct investment and foreign aid, which are not sensitive to interest rate 
differentials. Once these considerations are taken into account, fiscal and monetary 
                                                 
18  Lodewijks (1988) deals exhaustively with the limitations of real wage cuts in the context of PNG.  12 
policies assume radically different roles from what can be derived from the Mundell-
Fleming model and its variants. 
In particular, when the direct long-term (growth) and short-term (demand) aspects of 
macroeconomic policies are juxtaposed or treated simultaneously, employment 
creations do not depend on lower real wages (movement along the demand curve); 
instead, employment is created by shifting the labour demand curve. That is, what is 
needed in fragile economies such as Caribbean and Pacific Islands is state-led 
development strategies.  
4.2  Lessons from Singapore 
The conventional wisdom is that Singapore pursues conservative macroeconomic 
policies as is evident from its large foreign reserves and budget surpluses. However, 
close observers of Singapore believe that the use of government budget surplus is a 
misleading indicator of government’s fiscal stance due to the presence of various 
statutory boards and a large public sector. By the mid-1980s, prior to the start of 
privatization, there were about 490 government linked companies (GLCs) and 30 
statutory boards which had substantial monopoly power. Government often used these 
GLCs and statutory boards to pump-prime the economy whenever there was any sign of 
economic downturns. These measures do not show up in the budget of the government. 
Profits from GLCs and statutory boards subsidized deficits in government priority areas 
like housing which kept up the effective demand. Thus, Toh (2005: 43) draws attention: 
Far from non-intervention, the government believes in short-term 
discretionary measures to even out adverse impacts caused by the 
international business cycle and changing economic trends. Fiscal policy 
is a key instrument for aggregate demand management. 
In a rigorous study by using the IMF methodology of fiscal stance, Nadal-De Simone 
(2000) notes that contrary to the common view, fiscal policy in Singapore during 
1966-95 was not contractionary most of the time. Although the fiscal policy multiplier 
is found to be small due to the openness of the economy, the government did not shy 
away from using it, as it relied on the crowding-in factor of infrastructure and social 
investment.  
Fiscal policy in Singapore is used predominantly to promote non-inflationary economic 
growth—supporting investment, entrepreneurship, and job creation. GLCs and statutory 
boards were created since the late 1960s to jumpstart industrialization. The government 
also owned the largest bank, Development Bank of Singapore. Huff (1995) notes that 
government expenditure on infrastructure, accounting for 38 per cent of all gross capital 
formation, played a large role in Singapore’s annual real GDP growth of 5.7 per cent 
during the early phase (1960-66) of its development.  
Singapore was able to undertake public sector investment in a massive scale without 
incurring unsustainable debt and inflationary pressure due to its savings policy. There 
are three aspects of its national savings policy. The first is the strict adherence to the 
principle of achieving a surplus (or at least not run a deficit) in the current account of 
the government. Second, the government followed the commercial principle of profit 
generation for the GLCs and statutory bodies. Thus, primary budget surplus and profits 13 
from GLCs and statutory boards contribute substantially to the public sector savings. 
Finally, the scheme of compulsory contribution to the Central Provident Fund (CPF) 
forces every employee to save. The combined contribution by both employees and 
employers rose to 50 per cent of the payroll at its peak in the mid-1980s. These 
measures raised national savings from about 12 per cent of GDP in 1965 to close to 45 
per cent of GDP in 2004.  
The CPF scheme has been instrumental for non-inflationary development financing. 
First, the government could access a large pool of funds and did not have to borrow 
from the monetary authority which is inflationary. Second, the compulsory contribution 
to the CPF dampened demand pressure coming from public investment. It acted like an 
automatic stabilizer for inflation. Critics argue that GLCs together with the public sector 
crowd out private enterprise. However, there is little evidence of that in Singapore. 
‘Every $1 increase over the preceding decade in public sector capital formation was 
associated with an increase in private sector capital formation of $3 during the 1970s 
and $2.8 for 1980-1992’ (Huff 1995: 747). 
For Singapore, being highly dependent on external trade, management of the exchange 
rate has been crucial. The Singapore dollar exchange rate is based on a managed float 
system. The Monetary Author of Signapore manages the float within a target band 
based on an undisclosed trade-weighted basket of the currencies of Singapore’s major 
trading partners. Given the openness of Singapore with high import content, this seems 
to be a very sensible policy, as contractionary monetary or interest rate policy can only 
have limited effect on inflation, domestic inflation was kept low by allowing the 
exchange rate to appreciate in line with foreign inflation (Huff 1995: 752). Furthermore, 
reduction of the volatility of the exchange rate arising from exchange rate targeting may 
reduce uncertainty and hence promote trade.  
In order to retain some control on the monetary policy while following a managed 
exchange rate, Singapore had a number of measures. They included withholding tax on 
interest earned by non-residents on Singapore dollar holdings, preventing banks from 
making Singapore dollar loans to non-residents or residents for use outside Singapore, 
except to finance external trade. These amounted to restrictions on short-term capital 
flows while Singapore always welcomed foreign direct investment.  
Finally, Singapore used wages policy to complement its growth oriented fiscal and 
monetary policies. Through the regulation of the labour market (partly by legislation 
barring activist trade unionism and partly by regulating the foreign labour supply) and 
the tripartite wage determination at the National Wages Council, Singapore ensured that 
its unit labour cost remained internationally competitive.  
5  State-led development strategy 
This section outlines some basic features of state-led development strategy. 
5.1 Fiscal  policy 
Given the poor state of infrastructure, human resources and other critical factors for 
economic growth, and the lack of private investment in these areas (due to market 14 
failure or inadequate markets), the government has to play a leading role. This means a 
predominant role for fiscal policy both for the development and stabilization of 
economic cycles. This is, indeed, the recommendation of a recent IMF sponsored study 
of the Pacific Island economies.  
In the Pacific, the discouraging effects on private investment of high-
cost, low-quality utilities are aggravated by poor infrastructure. The 
region’s governments, together with donors, need to strengthen public 
investment efforts and ensure that such programs focus on developing 
physical and human capital that complement rather than substitute for 
private sector investment (Fichera 2006: 53). 
Obviously the question arises as to the financing of deficits and its implications for 
inflation and external balance, as well as the sustainability of government debt. First, we 
should note the ‘golden rule’—borrow to finance investment and balance 
recurrent/routine expenditure. If borrowing is done to invest productively, then debt will 
remain sustainable—economic growth will generate revenues to repair the budget 
deficit. Second, the aim should be to maintain debt sustainability over the cycle. That is, 
to have the political will to offset higher deficits incurred during downturns with higher 
revenues during the upswings. This may also mean adjusting back the safety-net and 
reducing the expenditure designed to jump-start the economy as well as expanding the 
revenue base. 
It is to be noted that a number of Caribbean and Pacific Island economies have fiscal 
stabilization funds. Reserves are accumulated in these funds during commodity booms 
to be used during the downswings. However, there are considerable doubts about the 
robustness of the political system, and elites in Caribbean and Pacific Island economies 
needed to prevent procycle bias of fiscal measures. Nonetheless, a number of 
institutional measures can be suggested to ensure the viability of countercyclical fiscal 
measures. For example, Perry (2003) believes that legislations regarding the 
government’s fiscal behaviour during upswings and downswings of the economy can 
potentially remove the pro-cycle bias of fiscal policy.19 However, the fiscal rule faces 
the dilemma between flexibility and credibility. Too rigid a rule to achieve credibility 
may lead to high costs in forgone flexibility. The fiscal rule to support countercyclical 
fiscal measures must also ensure long-term debt sustainability. Designing rules to 
balance between flexibility, credibility and sustainability may not be an easy task. 
Reviewing a number of countries that have some kind of fiscal rules, Perry finds the 
rule recently adopted by Chile requiring structural balance or model structural surplus 
most useful.20  
However, given the development needs of the small island economies, the fact remains 
that the governments will have to borrow in the short to medium-terms. Due to poor 
credit rating in the international capital markets and the lack of a well-developed 
domestic capital market, the governments have two options for borrowing:   
                                                 
19    Singapore has a legislation barring the current government’s access to accumulated reserves to 
prevent politically motivated expenditure.  
20  Application of Chilean type fiscal rule requires improvement of fiscal accounting, reliable estimation 
of potential output, and revenue elasticities. Countries would also have to develop ways to adjust for 
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(i) borrowing from central banks and (ii) foreign aid. Foreign aid, indeed, has been a 
significant source of government financing in both Caribbean and Pacific Island 
economies. 
Borrowing from central banks 
Borrowing from central banks will increase money supply.21 The endogeniety of money 
supply will prevent interest rates from rising, and hence, there will be no possibility of a 
crowding-out effect. On the contrary, government investment in  infrastructure and 
human resource development is likely to crowd-in private investment.22 While 
improved infrastructure reduces business costs, subsidized provisions of public health 
and education can be regarded as social wage, which dampens wage demand. Both 
factors enhance the investment climate.23  
Additionally, since the productive capacity of the economy is likely to expand with 
public investment, the increase in money supply will not be as inflationary. In any case, 
a moderate level of inflation is not found to be harmful for economic growth.24 In the 
absence of a well-developed taxation system, inflationary tax (or seigniorage) becomes 
an important source of government revenue for financing development.25 
Foreign aid 
It is a non-inflationary source of finance for the government. Foreign aid already plays a 
significant role. Pacific Island economies are one of the highest aid recipients among the 
developing world. There is a general perception, however, that the large aid flows failed 
to spur rapid economic growth.26 A recent comprehensive study of seven Pacific Island 
economies, however, finds a statistically significant positive relationship between aid 
and growth with diminishing returns (Pavlov and Sugden 2006).27 This finding is 
consistent with findings elsewhere and is not sensitive to either the policy environment 
or institutions. One recent World Bank study (2002a) also reports a positive relationship 
between foreign aid and economic growth in the Caribbean region. Thus, the findings 
                                                 
21 This option is available only to countries with their own currencies, controlled by a monetary 
authority. The option is also limited for countries with a currency board that links domestic money 
strictly to the availability of foreign currencies. 
22 World Bank (1998: xii), notes that in Pacific Island economies, “Basic education, health care, and 
physical infrastructure are the highest priorities to improve living standards for the widest group of 
poor people, and to lay the foundations for sustained, broad-based income growth.” 
23  This is in fact the experience of the successful East and Southeast Asian economies.  
24 See Chowdhury (2006). 
25  See Kalecki (1976).  
26 See, for example, Feeny (2007). However, a negative correlation between aid flows and economic 
growth could be just a statistical artefact. It may be due to the fact that in most cases, aid flows 
respond to natural disasters and other negative supply shocks which retard growth. None of the studies 
that report a negative aid-growth relationship conducted any counter-factual analysis. That is, what 
would have happened in the absence of aid? If aid responds to negative supply shocks then the non-
availability of aid is likely to exacerbate the impact of negative supply shocks and there would be a 
deeper drop in income.  
27 The seven Pacific Island economies studied are Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, 
Tonga and Vanuatu. 16 
imply that much of the lessons learnt in other countries are largely applicable to the 
Caribbean and Pacific Island economies. 
The apparent lack of aid effectiveness or diminishing returns to aid can be traced to a 
number of confounding factors. First is the uncertainty of disbursements and the 
divergence between commitments and disbursements. Aid volatility can cause 
significant problems for project implementation and government budget. Second, aid is 
fraught with principal-agent problems. The recipient countries not only renege on 
commitment to reforms, but also divert aid funds to undesirable uses, such as 
government consumption or development projects chosen purely on political grounds. 
Third, diminishing returns to aid could result from the lack of absorptive capacity. This 
may arise from a number of reasons, such as inability to provide counter-fund, 
deficiencies in planning and sequencing, as well as lack of administrative capacity. 
Finally, large aid flows can cause real appreciation of local currencies to the detriment 
of the tradable sector, known as Dutch disease syndrome.28 
The key element for addressing the above issues is the predictability of aid flows and 
confidence in the donor-recipient relationship. The Caribbean and Pacific Island 
economies experience high volatility of fiscal revenues due to their heavy reliance on 
trade. Aid is needed to smooth out fluctuations in revenues and should not be another 
source of shocks to the budget. Perhaps a ‘fiscal insurance scheme’ could be developed 
for the respective regions with donor funds to address volatility in fiscal revenues.29 
That is, donors can contribute a certain portion of aid to a regional common pool to be 
drawn by the country facing unforseen declines in fiscal revenues. The recipient 
countries should also contribute to this regional common pool a certain portion of their 
revenue windfalls.30 A jointly managed regional common pool or the fiscal insurance 
scheme as suggested above can play a positive role in improving donor-recipient 
relations.  
Donors can help overcome some of the absorptive capacity problems by not requiring 
counter-fund and providing technical assistance in aid management and administration. 
Other measures can also be considered to monitor aid administration. For example, aid 
may be used in helping national governments to strengthen democratic institutions 
designed for checks and balance on government expenditure.  
Finally, the possibility of Dutch disease is remote, as these countries do not operate at 
full employment, a vital assumption of the Dutch disease hypothesis. Moreover, the 
Dutch disease syndrome can be avoided in a number of ways. First, if aid is used for 
direct imports and/or technical assistance, then there is no need for real appreciation for 
                                                 
28 For evidence of Dutch disease syndrome in Pacific micro states, see Laplange, Treadgold and Baldry 
(2001). 
29 dos Reis (2004) highlights the usefulness of a fiscal insurance scheme for the countries of the 
Caribbean Currency Union. Such a scheme can alleviate problems of policy coordination within a 
currency union.  
30   Some Pacific countries already have a fiscal stabilization fund. The regional stabilization fund can 
supplement the national fund. 17 
resource transfer to occur. Second, if aid is used for productivity enhancing investment, 
then that offsets the impact of real exchange rate on competitiveness.31  
5.2 Monetary  policy 
Growth-oriented monetary policy has two features. First, as noted in the discussion 
about fiscal policy, monetary policy has to be accommodative to governments’ 
investment needs. This is premised on the large body of empirical evidence that 
moderate inflation does not harm economic growth, and may even be necessary. 
Furthermore, an accommodative monetary policy is needed to ease the counter-fund 
problem for the utilization of aid and hence enhance the absorption of aid.32 
Second, the monetary authorities should use low cost directed credits to support 
labour-intensive SMEs. The subsidized special credit programmes, of course, distort the 
credit market as well as run the risk of being infected with rent-seeking behaviour. 
However, the costs of distortions and rent-seeking have to be weighed against the costs 
of market failures in the credit market which result in discrimination against the SMEs 
and the agriculture sector.33 
  One may have concerns about the impact of low interest policies on savings and 
financial sector development. To begin with, low real interest rates must not mean 
negative real deposit interest rates which, in fact, have been the case in a number of 
Caribbean and Pacific Island economies. Second, empirical evidence shows that in 
low-income countries, financial development is mainly demand led. That is, it follows 
growth. This is consistent with the observation that current income plays a more 
dominant role in household savings decisions than the interest rate. Additionally, as the 
experience of Singapore shows, rapid mobilization of domestic savings depends more 
on non-market measures such as compulsory savings schemes and public sector 
surpluses than on real interest rates. Finally, low interest rate policy has advantages for 
both public debt sustainability and low inflation. It reduces interest payments on public 
debt as well as the business cost on account of working capital. Both factors contribute 
to low inflation.  
5.3  Exchange rate and capital account policies 
The Caribbean and Pacific Island economies have exchange rate systems ranging from 
currency union to dollarized and floating regimes. As expected, the dollarized 
economies have inflation rates close to the rates in the country of the currency they use, 
                                                 
31  See Chowdhury and McKinley (2007). 
32  The traditional rationale for aid is to fill the savings-investment gap and the current account gap. The 
savings-investment gap is generally related to government budget deficit. Aid funds are converted into 
domestic currency to be spent by the government which causes inflationary pressure leading to real 
appreciation. The real appreciation, in turn, causes higher imports to be financed by foreign currencies 
made available through aid in the first place. This is the normal channel through which aid gets spent 
and absorbed. Conservative fiscal and monetary policies, thus, only lead to accumulation of foreign 
reserves and defeat the purpose of aid. See Chowdhury and McKinley (2007). 
33 See Chowdhury (2006) for an illustration of various monetary policy instruments for achieving both 
employment and moderate inflation targets. 18 
and the countries with an independently floating system have higher inflation rates. The 
economies with a pegged exchange rate system have mixed experiences with inflation.  
As opposed to IMF’s suggestion for freer and more flexible currency regimes, recently 
some observers argued for a dollarized regime for the Pacific region, and the use of the 
Australian dollar in the Pacific economies.34 The argument is based on the insufficient 
depth of domestic financial and foreign exchange markets to support the liquidity 
necessary to maintain a freely floating exchange rate, and the lack of skilled personnel 
to run a central bank. The adoption of a strong foreign currency is also likely to impose 
fiscal discipline in economies where maintaining central bank independence is difficult. 
Some have also examined the possibility of forming a currency union like the East 
Caribbean Monetary Union.35 
While dollarization improves macroeconomic stability, the main objection to it may 
arise from the vastly different types of shocks between the Pacific Island economies and 
the country of strong currency (Australia, New Zealand and the US). Thus, responses to 
these shocks require some macroeconomic policy independence which will be lost if 
dollarized. Very low inflation rates of the strong currency country may be too 
constraining for these economies, which are prone to supply shocks and need to undergo 
structural change. Furthermore, dollarization will deprive them of seigniorage, and 
hence an important source of revenue for countries with a poor domestic revenue base.  
The currency unions are also not without problems, especially when there is a lack of 
significant convergence of macroeconomic indicators. At the same time, when their 
trade structure and partners are very similar, they are likely to suffer from the same 
terms-of-trade shocks almost simultaneously. This can place enormous pressure on the 
fiscal balance and monetary situation of all member countries, trying to adjust to the 
shock.  
Considering the pros and cons of various exchange rate regimes, it seems reasonable 
that the small island economies should follow an adjustable peg exchange rate system. 
As mentioned earlier, Singapore has been quite successful in using an adjustable peg 
exchange rate system to contain inflation.36 
However, an economy (or economic union) cannot have macroeconomic policy 
independence and open capital account under a pegged exchange rate system. This 
means there should be some restrictions on capital mobility. Neither the Caribbean nor 
the Pacific region receives much short-term private capital. Their main source of outside 
capital is foreign aid and workers’ remittance, which are not sensitive to interest rates. 
Their main problem is capital outflow, and it makes sense to have some controls on 
                                                 
34 de Brouwer (2002); Duncan (2002). Jayaraman (2005) does not find much support for using 
Australian dollar. Based on trade flow statistics, he argued that there is stronger case of adopting an 
Asian currency. Bowman (2006) concludes: ‘dollarization to the US dollar, the de-facto standard in 
Asia, or a move to a common currency may be preferable alternatives to dollarizing to the Australian 
dollar’. 
35 Jayaraman, Ward and Xu (2005). 
36 See Drake (1983) for a comprehensive discussion of exchange rate choices for small open economies. 
Drake suggests an intermediate regime between an absolutely fixed exchange rate regime with no 
monetary discretion and a fully flexible exchange rate regime with monetary discretion. 19 
capital flights. Restrictions on short-term capital outflows do not necessarily create any 
disincentives for long-term foreign direct investment.  
5 Concluding  remarks 
This paper has reviewed the macroeconomic performance of Caribbean and Pacific 
Island economies. Given the high volatility of their output growth and its adverse 
impacts on long-term growth as well as on the poor, the paper argued for the output 
stabilization role of macroeconomic policies. Drawing on the experience of Singapore, 
the paper also argued that contrary to the conventional wisdom, macroeconomic policies 
can play both stabilization and directly growth-promoting roles in highly open small 
economies. However, it requires some appropriate institutional frameworks to regulate 
the labour market, mobilization of savings, movements of short-term capital (capital 
flights), and the government’s fiscal behaviour. Given high aid-dependency, there also 
needs to be improvement in aid delivery and aid management. 
However, no one country is identical to another, and there are considerable differences 
among groups of countries. Thus, small island states need to be innovative in designing 
their own institutions based on their own history and context. Furthermore, given their 
size, remoteness and other constraints, it seems they would be better off by pooling 
regional capacity and resources. This would entail opening up their own markets to 
inflows of goods, services, capital and labour from the region, something akin to a 
currency union. 
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